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This paper examines questions related to possible capital account liberalisation in the 
Mediterranean countries. First, we provide an overview of the extent to which these 
countries have capital controls along with their exchange rate regimes and some basic 
macroeconomic aggregates. Second, we examine the case for capital account 
liberalisation, along with the prerequisites for successful liberalisation. Here we 
consider issues such as sequencing and possible benefits of synchronisation. Finally, 
we examine the experience with capital flows – both FDI and other capital flows. We 
explain these flows and use the past experience of these countries to draw some 
conclusions for the successful opening up of the capital account.  
 
 
Keywords: capital account liberalisation, Mediterranean countries, capital flows 
JEL Classification: F32, F21, F36 
 
Acknowledgements: We would like to thank Anna Capetanaki, a summer intern at the Bank 
of Greece, for her excellent research assistance during this project. The paper has also 
benefited from comments from participants at the ECB Workshop on Economic and Financial 
Developments in Mediterranean Countries (Frankfurt, 21/22 September 2005) including our 
discussants, George Syrichas and Bernhard Gauci. Finally we would like to thank Cristina 
Vespro who took the time to read the paper and provide many helpful remarks. The views 





Heather D. Gibson, 
Economic Research Department, 
Bank of Greece, 21, E. Venizelos Ave. 
102 50 Athens, Greece 
Tel: +30-210-3202415, Fax: +30-210-3233025 
E-mail: hgibson@bankofgreece.gr 1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the issues and challenges surrounding 
the question of capital account liberalisation in the so-called Mediterranean countries 
(Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, The Palestinian Authority, 
Syria and Tunisia). 
Capital account liberalisation can bring significant benefits to a country 
including increased access to international capital markets, greater FDI inflows and 
greater discipline in the exercise of economic policy. However, experience has shown 
that capital account liberalisation is not without its problems and challenges 
(Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1993; Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz, 1995; 1996; Begg 
et al, 1999; Gibson and Tsakalotos, 2004; 2005). We propose to explore these 
questions by examining the specific experience with capital flows in these countries 
as well as by drawing on the vast literature that has now been built up around the topic 
of external financial liberalisation. 
There are three main conclusions. First, the literature suggests that countries 
have a lot to gain from liberalisation. It will help to reduce the volatility of investment 
and growth and promote risk sharing. Second, the experience of these countries with 
non-FDI private capital flows indicates the importance of sound macroeconomic 
policies. Furthermore, whilst up until now contagion has not featured greatly in their 
experience, liberalisation in other regions suggests that this is unlikely to continue. 
Countries should therefore be prepared to deal with the challenges that liberalisation 
will throw up. Finally, there is scope for national and regional policies that could help 
boost FDI flows in these countries. Moreover policies can increase the effectiveness 
of the FDI attracted in terms of the benefits for the host economies. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present some 
stylised facts on capital flows, the extent of controls on capital movements, the type of 
exchange rate regime along with some basic macroeconomic aggregates for these 
countries. The aim of this section is to identify both similarities and differences 
between countries. Section 3 outlines the case for capital account liberalisation while 
section 4 examines the prerequisites for successful liberalisation, focusing explicitly 
on issues such as sequencing and the possible benefits that might be had from 
synchronised liberalisation. 
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end, we seek to explain the actual capital flow experience in these countries since the 
early 1990s. The focus is on capital flows excluding foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and, to the extent that we can given the data available, flows associated with either the 
government or the monetary authorities. The role of the exchange rate regime along 
with macroeconomic conditions and possible instances of contagion are examined. 
This reflects the factors which have been identified in the literature as being important 
in determining the likelihood of a country experiencing either large capital inflows or 
speculative attacks. 
Section 6 focuses on FDI flows. The rationale for their separate examination is 
that they are quite different from the other private capital flows of section 5. We 
catalogue the extent of FDI at present and focus on the factors which influence FDI. 
Some conclusions are also presented on the potential for inward FDI to increase, 
something which could provide a useful boost to growth along with positive 
externalities for other sectors of the economy. 
Finally, section 7 offers some concluding remarks in the light of the previous 
analyses. 
 
2. The Mediterranean countries: some stylised facts 
We begin by trying to draw out a few stylised facts for the Mediterranean 
countries. With the focus of the paper being on capital flows and capital account 
liberalisation, it is useful to examine the history of the monetary and exchange rate 
regimes operated by these countries along with the situations vis-à-vis the extent to 
which capital flows are liberalised. At the same time, we provide some information on 
the general macroeconomic performance from the early 1990s onwards in an attempt 
to set the scene for the rest of the paper. 
Table 1 catalogues the history of exchange rate regimes in the region. What 
stands out clearly from the information given is that all countries have had or still do 
have a pegged exchange rate of some kind. Indeed, if we take all 9 countries in Table 
1 and classify each year for each country as being characterised by some kind of 
pegged exchange rate or not, then only 13% of the sample observations can be 
considered as having a floating or managed-floating exchange rate. Over time, the 
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still operate some kind of peg. 
Some history of controls on capital movements in 9 Mediterranean countries is 
to be found in Table 2 and an index of capital controls is shown in Figure 1.
1 All 
countries, except Lebanon, had a fairly extensive system of controls in place in the 
early 1990s. Israel and Jordan have by and large liberalised capital flows while the 
general trend in the other countries, with the exception of Lebanon, is for varying 
degrees of liberalisation; in some countries extensive controls still remain in place. 
One interesting factor which emerges from a matching of the information in Tables 1 
and 2, is the fact that two of the countries with more liberalised capital flows also 
moved towards a more flexible exchange rate (Egypt and Israel). Jordan, however, 
remains with its effective peg to the dollar. 
When examining capital flows, it is useful to distinguish two main types: private 
flows and those related to government or monetary authorities’ borrowing/lending. 
Within private capital flows, the breakdown into FDI flows and other private capital 
flows is also useful. The rationale for breaking capital flows up into these three parts 
is two-fold. First, part of our interest lies with the impact of capital flows on 
macroeconomic policy making. The fact that the government/monetary authorities 
could try to offset the effect of private sector flows on the rest of the economy (by 
undertaking mirror-image transactions), suggests that a better measure of the pressure 
on macroeconomic policy comes from an examination of private capital flows only. 
Second, the division of private flows into FDI and other flows stems from the fact that 
(as we discuss in greater detail below) FDI flows are usually seen as longer-term and 
hence result from long-term decisions about the productive capabilities of the country 
whereas other flows can be more speculative in nature. 
Figures 2a-2f and Figure 3 provide a graphic account of various measures of 
capital flows as a proportion of GDP
2 for those countries for which data exists in the 
IMF’s  Balance of Payments statistical source.
3 Each graph includes the various 
                                                 
1 This index of capital control intensity aims not only to provide a comparison for individual countries 
over time, but also between countries. Details of its construction are given in Appendix 1. 
2 Our focus is on net flows because our primary interest in this paper is the impact of capital flows on 
macroeconomic management. 
3 An alternative source of statistics on capital flows is the World Bank World Global Development 
Finance Report. However, the data provided there is rarely more complete than that of the IMF source 
used here. Moreover, the emphasis in the World Bank data is on long-term net resource flows and 
  7measures with errors and omissions and without errors and omissions. In countries 
where capital controls are extensive, errors and omissions can help to identify hidden 
capital flows or contain what has been called in the literature “capital flight” 
(Cuddington, 1986). Indeed it is clear from the figures that there is some systematic 
behaviour in the errors and omissions data, especially for Jordan (pre-liberalisation) 
and Israel. Overall, however, the effect of excluding errors and omissions does not 
seem to have much of an impact on the basic trend in net capital flows and 
quantitatively their magnitude is rather small compared to the general level of net 
flows. 
A similar conclusion can be drawn for the impact of including or excluding 
government/monetary authorities flows – it does not materially affect the conclusions 
we draw about the nature of net capital flows. By contrast, the removal of net flows of 
FDI, whilst not affecting the overall trend or volatility of net capital flows, does tend 
to shift the volume of net capital inflows downward – often by around 1-2 percentage 
points of GDP. 
Normally it is desirable to have quarterly data or, even better, monthly data on 
net capital flows. However, for this group of countries data frequency is a problem – 
quarterly data is available for only Jordan and Israel. Quarterly (or even monthly) 
flows are usually more revealing for the following reason. Since net capital flows can 
often reverse quickly, annual data tends to smooth the flows and therefore hide 
substantial difficulties which might have been experienced over any particular year. 
Thus, for example, an exchange rate peg which might have become increasingly non-
credible could lead to large outflows which are quickly reversed to inflows once the 
expected devaluation of the exchange rate takes place. 
A comparison of Figures 2b, 2c and 3 illustrates that the extent of the problem 
here is not great. To take the case of Israel, we can identify two periods – a number of 
years in the mid-1990s with strong net capital inflows and the experience of 2003 
with quite significant net outflows. These periods are clearly evident even in the 
quarterly data where the direction of the flows shows quite a bit of persistence. This 
persistence implies that annual data does not smooth out the interesting patterns that 
                                                                                                                                            
transfers and is more suitable for an examination of, for example, the growth implications of capital 
flows. On this issue, see Laureti and Postiglione (2005) who examine the effect of different types of 
capital inflows on growth in these countries. The results however are poor, with only portfolio bond 
flows and short-term debt flows having a positive effect on growth. 
  8might have been evident throughout the year. The same conclusion can be drawn (if 
not even stronger) for Jordan. 
The figures suggest that net capital flows are often large (regularly of the order 
of 5% of GDP; occasionally reaching 15% and even 20% or more). These magnitudes 
are similar to those found in the new EU member states (see Gibson and Tsakalotos, 
2004) and also to Greece and Portugal prior to their entry into the euro area (Gibson 
and Tsakalotos, 2005). Net capital flows of that magnitude are certainly of interest in 
that they can and do have important effects on macroeconomic policy management. 
One way in which net capital flows can complicate macroeconomic policy is 
through their effect on changes in the monetary authorities’ foreign exchange reserve 
holdings. Thus inflows can raise reserves and hence base money contributing to 
excess liquidity in the domestic financial system; outflows can cause reserves to fall 
and make an exchange rate peg difficult to defend. Table 3 provides some simple 
correlations between capital flows and changes in reserves for the whole period and 
periods distinguished according to the exchange rate regime in place. What is very 
interesting is the strong negative correlation between flows and reserves. This 
contrasts strongly with the experience of the southern European EU member states 
(Greece, Portugal and Spain, Gibson and Tsakalotos, 2005) and the new EU member 
states (Gibson and Tsakalotos, 2004). The experience of these other countries was 
clear – capital flows and changes in reserves were positively correlated overall and 
more so during periods of more fixed exchange rates. For the Mediterranean countries 
under examination here, it appears to be the current account which drives changes in 
reserves (see last column of Table 3). 
Finally, in this section we want to provide some stylised macroeconomic facts 
for the Mediterranean countries. Macroeconomic conditions affect not only private 
non-FDI flows, but also FDI flows. Tables A1-A5 in Appendix 2 provide some basic 
aggregates (where available from IMF’s International Financial Statistics). Table A1 
suggests a common growth pattern – growth rates were on average higher but quite 
variable in the 1990s; since the turn of the century growth rates have fallen somewhat. 
This decline in growth rates has also been accompanied by a systematic decline in 
inflation across the whole region to levels which could be considered to be consistent 
with price stability (especially for countries at their level of development). Egypt in 
2004 is an outlier, although the sharp rise in inflation presumably reflects the quite 
  9extensive depreciation of the Egyptian pound over the last few years and especially 
since the peg was effectively abandoned in 2002. 
Government budget deficits cannot be said to have improved along with 
inflation; more importantly, there is no clear trend across the region. Table A3 
suggests that a number of countries have significant budgetary problems although 
comparable data across countries is difficult to come by and makes inter-country 
comparisons of levels difficult. Finally, it is probably not an exaggeration to say that 
the current account position of most countries (with the notable exception of 
Lebanon) is eminently sustainable. 
 
3. The case for capital account liberalisation 
Capital account liberalisation should be seen as an instrument to improve the 
credibility of the policy environment in order to foster greater capital inflows. For the 
majority of Mediterranean countries, their level of development suggests that they 
should be importers of capital – in the presence of capital shortages, the rate of return 
on physical capital should be higher than in other countries. While many countries are 
willing to accept foreign direct investments (with the possible exception of those 
destined for “sensitive” sectors), they are loath to allow outward capital flows, or what 
is deemed as “speculative” capital inflows, such as portfolio investments. 
Nonetheless, the full liberalisation of all capital flows could help to reassure markets 
about the direction of policies
4. For a foreign investor the ability to “exit” a market 
with low costs is as important as the ability to enter it in the first place.  
In general, we can distinguish two motives for a country to open up its capital 
account: first to attract the capital necessary to finance investments; and, second, as a 
risk-sharing instrument to smooth out country-specific idiosyncratic shocks. Countries 
in the region need foreign capital for both these reasons. To assess the likely benefits 
for Mediterranean countries, in the rest of this section we compare them with a 
“control group” of countries that include all the Mediterranean members of the EU, 
                                                 
4 An example of the importance of full capital account liberalisation in reassuring the markets was 
Greece’s response to balance of payments pressures in 1994. Following a change of government, 
doubts about the future path of policies prompted capital outflows. Instead of trying to tighten capital 
controls, the government proceeded to the full liberalisation of capital flows, a move that helped 
reassure markets and stop the outflows. 
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EU Mediterranean countries until recently. 
The per capita income of the Mediterranean countries (with the exception of 
Israel) lags significantly behind that of southern European EU members. More 
interestingly, growth rates have also been lower, leading to divergence, rather than 
convergence to advanced economies’ levels (Figure 4). Due to some extent to the 
lower diversification of these economies, but also as a result of geopolitical tensions 
in the region, the variability of their growth rates has been significantly higher than 
that of their European neighbours (see Table 4) making it all the more important for 
these countries to have recourse to risk-sharing opportunities, such as foreign capital 
flows.  
The importance of uncertainty for these countries can be gauged from their 
investment performance. While the investment ratio has been sufficiently high, 
averaging about 20 percent of GDP in recent years, investment growth has been quite 
volatile – in fact, about 1½ times more volatile than in the control group of countries 
(see Table 5). Moreover, we can note that the Mediterranean countries have attracted 
relatively few foreign direct investments (FDI). Faced with heightened uncertainty, 
foreign investors have scaled back their investments and demanded higher returns. 
We return to this issue in section 6 of the paper. 
The absence of risk-sharing opportunities in the Mediterranean countries is 
evident from the fact that their investment has been constrained by domestic savings. 
In the absence of adequate data for an analysis along the lines of Feldstein-Horioka 
(1980), we look at the current account deficit, which by definition should be the 
difference between domestic saving and investment. A look at the current account of 
these countries is quite informative. The overall picture that emerges is that countries 
in the region have had low and relatively stable current account deficits (Table A4). 
Indeed, some countries such as Algeria and Libya have had chronic current account 
surpluses, implying that they are capital exporters (mainly a consequence of their 
energy exports), despite their comparatively low level of development. 
The implication is that despite significant output variability they have made little 
use of international capital markets to smooth domestic spending. Essentially, they 
have sought to finance their domestic investment mainly through domestic savings. It 
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their economies, since it forces investors to be myopic, leads to the abandonment of 
ongoing projects when finance dries up and does not allow the accumulation of 
“learning-by-doing” capital. 
If the costs of capital account controls have been high in the past in terms of 
constraining investment, they are likely to be even higher in the future. The 
investment needs of the countries in the region have increased recently due to two 
developments, the enlargement of the EU and the expiration of the Multi-Fibre 
Agreement, both of which have worsened their competitive position. They will thus 
have to embark on a significant effort to modernize and upgrade their industries, 
which will require significant investments.  
It thus appears reasonable to expect that opening up the capital account will 




4. The path to capital account liberalisation 
While countries in the region will benefit by setting the target of eventual capital 
account liberalisation, it should be pointed that an abrupt liberalisation could carry 
significant risks of destabilisation. Indeed experience has shown that there is an 
optimal path of economic liberalisation (McKinnon, 1982; 1991) and there is now 
widespread consensus on what that optimal path should look like.  
Most of the countries in the region are in the very early stages of external 
liberalisation. Three countries (Algeria, Libya and Syria) are not yet members of the 
WTO, while trade liberalisation has been limited for most of the others. For the two 
countries for which detailed information is available, Egypt and Morocco, the average 
import tariff rate for non-agricultural products is estimated at 21 percent and 30 
percent respectively, compared with an EU average of about 5 percent. In addition, 
one country (Syria) has not yet accepted the (admittedly limited) obligations of Art. 
VIII of the IMF regarding the liberalisation of current payments. 
                                                 
5 A possible caveat to the argument that uncertainty/volatility can be reduced by access to international 
capital markets is that inflows tend to be drawn to areas where these countries have a comparative 
advantage. This, in turn, increases dependence on a few export items and might exacerbate cyclicality 
of income. 
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the burden of adjustment in the face of shocks would fall predominantly on the capital 
account. It is important that liberalisation of trade take place before either domestic 
financial or external financial liberalisation since tariffs distort relative prices. If 
financial markets are liberalised yet prices remain distorted, then finance will be 
attracted to artificially-profitable sectors and a misallocation of resources will ensue. 
More generally, trade and current account liberalisation would help reassure investors 
about the process of liberalisation. 
Capital account liberalisation also requires a liberalised domestic financial 
sector. If external financial liberalisation occurs before domestic interest rates have 
been adjusted to world levels, then large capital outflows would ensue. In addition the 
domestic financial system should exhibit a certain degree of maturity so that it is in a 
position to understand the risks inherent in a liberalised environment and develop 
appropriate strategies. It is not only financial institutions but also non-financial 
companies and individual consumers that face the risks arising from the increased 
volatility of interest rates and/or exchange rates. A developed financial sector should 
be able to provide a range of products to protect consumers of these products from 
such risks. The evidence is that up to now there has been limited domestic 
liberalisation. This can be seen from the fact that real interest rates have remained 
stable and negative in many cases for prolonged periods. A developed financial 
market can also help policy-making in a liberalised environment. Trying to sterilise 
even modest financial flows in a thin market for government securities could have 
significant destabilising effects and may eventually prove to be impossible. Thus, in 
parallel with, or even before, external liberalisation, governments should embark on 
liberalising domestic markets and developing a sufficiently deep bond market by 
offering realistic market-based interest rates. 
Related to the optimal path to capital account liberalisation is the issue of the 
necessary conditions that need to be satisfied in order to ensure the success along the 
path. In this respect it is widely acknowledged that a stable macroeconomic 
environment is an important requirement (McKinnon, 1991). The experience of the 
Asian Crisis has also highlighted the importance of establishing high standards in 
bank supervision practices in order to ensure financial stability (Goldstein, 1998). 
Moreover, the well known policy “trilemma” between free capital flows, fixed 
  13exchange rates and monetary policy independence
6 implies that the choice of 
exchange rate regime needs to be carefully considered as it will have important 
implications for the ability of a country to effectively exercise an independent 
monetary policy. 
A final issue that has more recently been raised in the literature is whether there 
is anything to be gained by regional coordination of the liberalisation process. Begg et 
al (1999) argue that capital mobility increases more with simultaneous liberalisation 
across a number of countries. That is, the absolute level of capital flows (both inflows 
and outflows) increases significantly. This conclusion follows from their examination 
of capital flows and liberalisation in Western Europe (1980s) and Asia (1990s). Thus 
simultaneous liberalisation could cause a regional shock and make capital flows more 
volatile in the region. 
However, unilateral liberalisation by one country is no panacea. The liberalising 
country may confer negative externalities on others by absorbing capital flows from 
its neighbours. Most of the Mediterranean countries are usually seen as belonging to 
the same risk class and face in many respects similar shocks. As a first step, it might 
be useful to promote the regional trading of fixed-income securities, for example, by 
creating regional markets for such instruments and by coordinating their issuance. 
This could help deepen the market, and familiarize both domestic savers and foreign 
investors with the new opportunities. 
 
5. Problems and challenges of capital account liberalisation 
If capital account liberalisation can bring about potential benefits, it should not 
also be forgotten that it raises a number of challenges for macroeconomic policy 
making, especially in countries with some form of exchange rate peg or where the 
monetary authorities care about the level of the exchange rate. Such countries 
frequently suffer from periods of large net capital inflows (excess credibility) or large 
net outflows (speculative attacks). Both complicate the conduct of macroeconomic 
policy considerably. 
                                                 
6 Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2004) provide empirical evidence on the relevance of this 
“trilemma”. 
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Excess credibility exists if the exchange rate target is highly credible, whilst, at the 
same time, the monetary authorities are pursuing a tight monetary policy in order to 
lower inflation. The problem can be compounded further if the government has a 
relatively loose fiscal policy. The result is that domestic interest rates are higher than 
the foreign rate plus the expected depreciation of the domestic currency. Such a 
situation encourages large net capital inflows, as nonresidents take advantage of high 
rates of return and residents borrow abroad, both with little perceived foreign 
exchange risk. 
Net capital inflows, however, have consequences for the domestic money 
market. If the country is to keep its exchange rate target and prevent nominal 
appreciation of the currency, it has to intervene and sell domestic currency in the 
foreign exchange market. This causes foreign exchange reserves to increase. As a 
result the monetary base increases and an excess supply of liquidity in the interbank 
market at prevailing interest rates is generated. This can undermine the attempt to 
disinflate or to maintain inflation at acceptable levels. Such problems were common 
in southern European countries such as Greece, Portugal and Spain during the period 
of macroeconomic convergence before entry into the euro area (Gibson and 
Tsakalotos, 2005). In some periods, the increase in reserves as a consequence of 
capital inflows was substantial suggesting that the above scenario was indeed 
common in practice. 
Excessive net capital outflows can be equally problematic for macroeconomic 
policy. A sudden withdrawal of capital can undermine an exchange rate peg as the 
monetary authorities find it increasingly difficult to maintain the credibility of the 
current exchange rate in the face of declining foreign exchange reserves. If successful 
the speculative attack may lead to the peg being abandoned, thus undermining the 
credibility of the monetary policy strategy being pursued. A rapid depreciation of the 
currency can also have negative consequences for inflation. 
In the light of the implications of net capital flows for the conduct of 
macroeconomic policy, it seems important that we attempt to discover their 
determinants. In this section, the focus is on private net capital flows excluding FDI. 
The relevant literature falls into two groups, namely that which examines the 
determinants of net capital flows and that which looks explicitly at speculative attacks 
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kind). We can divide the factors which are usually considered in the literature into two 
groups. First, there are the macroeconomic determinants (inflation, money, interest 
rates, growth, budget deficits); second, there is the impact of contagion, either via 
fundamentals or through psychological effects (examples of the latter include the 
impact of the SE Asian crisis in 1997 and the Russian crisis in 1998).
7
Given the data limitations and the extent of net flows observed, the main focus 
here is an examination of the determinants of net capital flows in general. Ideally, this 
requires quarterly data on private net capital flows excluding FDI flows
8. 
Unfortunately, as we say in section 2, data on quarterly flows is limited and the 
breakdown of the financial account in the IMF Balance of Payments data is often not 
sufficient to extract only private flows. Thus we confine our main analysis to the 
annual data. More specifically, we estimate the following equation
9: 
 
KFit = αi + βERRit + γ∆Pit + δ∆lnyit + εGBit + ηFIit + ζ∆Μit +κrdit + λrfit + µKKit
           + νRussiat + ξAsiat             ( 1 )  
 
where KFit are net capital inflows (excluding FDI) into country i at time t as a 
proportion of GDP; ERRit is a dummy indicating some form of pegged exchange rate 
regime; ∆Pit is inflation (the change in the CPI); ∆lnyit is the rate of growth of real 
GDP; GBit is the government balance as a proportion of GDP; FIit is the ratio of 
M2/GDP which attempts to examine whether the degree of financial system 
development influences capital flows; ∆Mit is broad money growth which could 
influence inflation expectations and hence net inflows; rdit and rfit are the domestic and 
foreign (US) interest rates, respectively
10; KKit is the index of capital control intensity 
                                                 
7 For a comprehensive review of the literature in this area, see Gibson (2003), Gibson and Tsakalotos 
(2004; 2005). 
8 We examine FDI flows separately in the next section. Whilst FDI flows can equally complicate the 
conduct of macroeconomic policy, their long-run nature tends to imply that the determinants of such 
flows are rather different. 
9 The absence of data on the stock of assets held abroad by residents or the stock of domestic assets 
held by non-residents prevents us from estimating a full portfolio model which includes a long-run 
relationship between asset stocks and their determinants. Rather we have to be content here with 
focusing on the short-run dynamics of net capital flows. Given our interest in the interaction between 
capital flows and macroeconomic policy, this is perhaps not too serious a drawback. 
10 We test for the significance of both the interest rates in levels and first differences. A portfolio model 
of net capital flows would suggest that changes in interest rates should affect flows and not their levels. 
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Russian crisis of August 1998 (it takes a value of 1 during the third and/or fourth 
quarter of 1998); finally, Asiat is a dummy capturing the possible effects of the Asian 
financial crisis (it takes a value of 1 during the third and/or fourth quarters of 1997). 
The time period examined runs from 1990 to 2003 (with the actual time span for each 
country depending on data availability). We experiment with various lags since often 
net capital flows are responding to data which refers to a previous period. 
The results for various estimation methods are given in Table 6; we treat the 
countries as a panel and run a fixed effects regression, since our interest is not so 
much in the detailed experience of individual countries but rather the general 
experience of the group as a whole. This is not to deny that specific country effects 
are present. The fact that the fixed effects are highly significant in all the models 
considered testifies to this (see F tests in Table 6). The preference for a fixed effects 
model over a random effects model is clear from the Hausman test provided for model 
2. 
Model 1 includes five countries (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia; 
there is no domestic interest rate for Syria for the period) for which there exist annual 
data on net capital flows excluding FDI flows. Model 2 provides a parsimonious 
version of model 1 where insignificant variables have been deleted (hence Syria is 
now included in the sample). The results suggest that sustained growth has a positive 
impact on net capital inflows whereas government deficits tend to encourage net 
outflows. Higher inflation reduces net inflows as expected as does our proxy for 
expected future inflation, the rate of growth of broad money. The degree of financial 
development (as represented by M2/GDP) appears to affect capital flows negatively; 
that is, as the level of financial development rises, so there is a tendency for countries 
to experience net capital outflows. This is perhaps not surprising – with financial 
development comes an increasing sophistication on the part of investors which is 
likely to lead to their seeking to diversify their portfolios by investing abroad. In the 
initial period after liberalisation this can cause significant outflows until equilibrium is 
reached.
11 Capital controls help to support net inflows or reduce net outflows 
                                                 
11 The M2/GDP ratio exhibits quite a lot of variability over time (see table A5 in Appendix 2) hence 
multicollinearity with the fixed effects is not considered to be an issue. We note, however, that - in line 
with our expectations - for some countries there is considerable negative correlation between the 
financial development proxy and the capital controls intensity index. Nevertheless, we do not consider 
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outflows. Whilst domestic and foreign interest rates have the expected signs, they are 
not significant. Finally, the impact of the exchange rate regime is also highly 
insignificant (perhaps reflecting the fact that our sample is heavily biased in favour of 
country-years where some form of exchange rate peg was in operation). 
The results tend to support the view that macroeconomic fundamentals are 
important determinants of net capital flows. Interestingly, there is little effect from 
contagion either from the SE Asian crisis or the Russian crisis of the late 1990s. This 
contrasts strongly with the result for the new EU member states (Gibson and 
Tsakalotos, 2004) or the southern European EU member states (Gibson and 
Tsakalotos, 2005). It probably reflects the somewhat disparate nature of the countries 
in the sample and the fact that, until recently, interest in the countries as a group from 
the international capital markets has been limited. By contrast, the southern European 
EU member states and, in turn, the new member states were important destinations for 
emerging market investment. The experience of these latter two groups of countries 
probably has much more to say about the likely future experience of the 
Mediterranean countries; we cannot assume, that is, that contagion is not something 
that will affect these countries in the future. 
One potential criticism of the estimation technique used is that it does not 
control for the possible endogeneity of growth and the index of capital controls. Net 
capital inflows could increase growth and may also provoke a response by the 
authorities that takes the form of tightening or loosening controls on capital 
movements. In model 3 we re-estimate model 2 using panel instrumental variables 
techniques. The results are qualitatively similar to those of model 2, although the 
significance of the coefficients falls somewhat. 
Finally, Table 7 presents the results of model 4 which considers whether the 
determinants of net capital flows differ according to whether there is a net inflow 
(positive net capital flow) or a net outflow (negative net capital flow). To this end, we 
construct two dummy variables taking, respectively, a value of 1 when there is a net 
inflow or a net outflow. The results suggest that the direction of the effect of any one 
explanatory variable is the same irrespective of whether the country is experiencing a 
                                                                                                                                            
this to be a serious drawback for our estimation results given that both variables turn out to be 
significant. 
  18net inflow or outflow. Thus, an increase in the rate of growth of broad money reduces 
net inflows when they are positive and when they are negative (equivalent in the latter 
case to an increase in outflows).
12 Whilst the direction of the effect of any particular 
explanatory variable does not change, an interesting result is that the magnitude and 
significance of the results often can. Thus growth tends to increase net flows when 
they are inflows; an increase in growth when there are outflows has no significant 
effect. Similarly changes in inflation tend to have a larger impact on net flows when 
there are net outflows rather than net inflows
13. 
In conclusion, therefore, the results provide quite a bit of support for the 
importance of sound macroeconomic policies for avoiding excessive net capital flows, 
whether they be inflows or outflows. There is little evidence that the Mediterranean 
countries experienced contagion, at least over the period under consideration here. 
 
6. Foreign direct investment flows 
FDI flows need to be considered separately from other capital flows for a 
number of reasons.
14 Firstly, FDI flows have different characteristics: they are of 
longer-term nature, they mainly depend on the real characteristics of the host 
economy and they do not exhibit excessively erratic patterns caused, for example, by 
contagion effects. Secondly, they differ in terms of the consequences they have on the 
host economy: in addition to the impact on monetary conditions and exchange rate 
dynamics that is shared by all capital inflows, they affect investment and employment 
as well as having potentially significant secondary spillover effects that improve the 
                                                 
12 The only exception to this is the case of the dummy for an exchange rate peg (not reported). While 
not significant, a peg both increases net inflows and net outflows as would be expected. The 
insignificance can perhaps be attributed to the existence of capital controls which were more intense 
overall during pegs. 
13 We also redefined the dependent variable as a binary variable and ran two logit regressions. The first 
examines the case of “large” net capital outflows (where “large” is defined, for each country, as the 
mean net capital flow minus half a standard deviation of net capital flows) compared to all other net 
flows; the second the case of “large” net inflows (defined as the mean net capital flow plus half a 
standard deviation of net capital flows). The results (available on request from the authors) are 
consistent with the above findings, although they are only weakly significant. Thus higher inflation and 
a more developed financial system increases the probability of a large net outflow while increased 
intensity of controls on capital movements decrease the probability of a large net outflow. Increases in 
growth and the government surplus increase the probability of large net inflows as does an increase in 
the intensity of the capital control index (probably reflecting the fact that most controls are on 
outflows). Increased financial development reduces the probability of a large net inflow. 
14 Bosworth and Collins (1999) show that the distinction of FDI from other capital flows is also 
supported by the data. 
  19growth performance and potential of the economy. There is, however, a further reason 
to distinguish FDI flows from other capital flows, namely that, in view of the potential 
benefits outlined above, most of the countries under review have already liberalised 
FDI inflows.
15,   16 This gives us the opportunity here to examine the success these 
countries have had in attracting FDI.  
Benefits and risks of FDI  
From the perspective of the Mediterranean countries, the most prominent benefit 
of FDI, as indicated in section 3, is that it can provide them with the funds necessary 
to finance the investment required to boost growth. The importance of this role 
notwithstanding, particularly in economies where growth is constrained by the amount 
of capital available and where it is important to minimise the consumption sacrifice 
required to finance investment, FDI can potentially provide significant additional 
benefits. Foreign investments, particularly in greenfield projects, can become valuable 
channels for the transfer of technology, know-how and modern management practices 
(Findlay, 1978; Wang and Blomström, 1992). Moreover, according to this argument, 
to the extent that foreign-owned firms have linkages with local firms, there can be 
significant externalities or spillover effects that lead to an overall increase in the level 
of technology, skills and efficiency in the host economy (see for example Lim, 2001). 
New growth theory highlights the importance of the adoption of new technology as a 
principal factor determining the rate of growth of a developing country (see, for 
example, Balasubramanyam et al, 1996). The transfer and diffusion of technology is 
therefore a potentially important function of FDI, particularly in the Mediterranean 
region where the level of technology, as measured by most relevant indices, remains 
relatively low (with the notable exception of Israel; see Figure 5). Further potentially 
beneficial effects of FDI relate to the consequent increase in competition in the local 
market through the entry of new market participants and the drive towards 
restructuring the economy on a more efficient basis, an issue also particularly 
pertinent to most countries in the Mediterranean region due to the relatively large 
presence of the public sector in several of these economies (Petri, 1997). Finally, 
foreign investment can help host economies increase their access to world markets, 
particularly to the market of the source country (OECD, 2002). 
                                                 
15 Some controls still remain in force in Lebanon and Libya, see table 2. 
16 Outward FDI is still subject to restrictions in most of the countries under consideration, however the 
scope of this paper will be limited to inward FDI. 
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Nevertheless FDI can also be associated with some risks or costs. Large foreign 
companies, in some cases, abuse their dominant market position and attempt to 
influence host country political developments (Findlay, 1978). Moreover, large 
investors may be able to achieve considerable concessions from host country 
governments as an incentive to invest there and/or practice transfer pricing in such a 
way so as to minimise their local tax burden thereby extracting most or all of the 
benefits from the externalities of the investment (Demekas et al, 2005). Additionally, 
FDI may increase the volatility of balance of payments flows due to the pattern of 
flows it involves (a large, one-off inflow and then a series of outflows related to profit 
or capital repatriation). Finally, the restructuring of the economy previously cited as a 
benefit may have undesirable distributional implications, while the entry of large 
foreign competitors may crowd smaller local participants out of the market, thereby 
reducing rather than increasing the degree of competition (UNCTAD, 2004; OECD, 
2002). 
Although this is by no means an uncontroversial issue, most views seem to be 
converging to the position that, from a theoretical perspective, the overall effect for 
the host economy is positive. Indeed this view is shared by policymakers in a number 
of developing countries who have elevated the improvement of their economies’ 
performance in attracting FDI to a prominent place in the economic policy agenda. 
Empirical research tends to support this hypothesis, although again dissenting views 
are not lacking.
17 For developing countries in particular, Borensztein et al (1998) 
investigate the effect of FDI on growth in 69 economies and conclude that a one 
percentage point increase in FDI flows results in an increase in the host country 
growth rate by 0.4 – 0.9 percentage points.  
The data from the Mediterranean countries prima facie confirms the existence of 
a positive relationship between the stock of FDI an economy has received and its 
growth rate (Figure 6), although the direction of causality is not clear. Bouklia-
Hassane and Zatla (2000) investigate this relationship in the countries of the region 
more formally using panel estimation techniques and find a positive albeit not very 
significant effect of FDI (as a percentage of GDP) on growth. When they enlarge the 
                                                 
17 See Lim (2001) and Borensztein et.al. (1998) for a survey of the empirical literature on the effect of 
FDI on growth. Rodrik (1999) provides a dissenting view. 
  21cross-section dimension of the panel to include 54 developing economies, the 
relationship becomes highly significant. The authors interpret this as possible 
evidence of the existence of a threshold effect and of the importance of the level of 
human capital in affecting the effectiveness of FDI. 
The FDI performance of the Mediterranean countries 
Since the early 1990’s there has been a surge of FDI flows to developing 
countries, which from approximately $21.4 billion per annum on average during the 
1980s were almost six times higher at $121.8 billion on average in the 1990s. The 
Mediterranean countries, as a group, have not however been able to benefit 
accordingly from this, since average annual total flows into the region increased only 
by a factor of three, from $1.1 billion during the 1980’s to $3.3 billion in the 1990’s. 
As a result, the region’s share in total FDI received by developing countries has 
diminished significantly, from a peak of 10.7% in 1985 to merely 2.1% in 1996, 
although this downward trend appears to have reversed since then and Mediterranean 
countries have started to gradually regain some of their lost share (Figure 7). The 
region’s rather disappointing performance in attracting FDI is also reflected in the 
FDI-to-GDP ratios (Figure 8), which are consistently the lowest among other 
developing country groups. It is noted, however, that the performance of the 
Mediterranean region in attracting FDI does not necessarily reflect the efforts made 
by the countries in this area to increase foreign investment, particularly in recent 
years. We shall revisit the issue of the determinants of FDI later. 
The overall picture, nevertheless, masks quite diverse performances by the 
countries in the region (Figure 9). Morocco, Jordan, Israel and Tunisia have FDI-to-
GDP ratios that are considerably higher than the regional average and are on an 
upward trend. Egypt on the other hand, which used to attract the largest FDI flows in 
the area, is on a downward trend. To gauge the performance of the countries in the 
region we compare it to the potential of these economies (figure 10), using the 
respective indices reported in UNCTAD (2004).
18 This confirms that, for the period 
2000-2002, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Israel were doing well in attracting FDI, 
with the former two performing above their potential. While Algeria and Syria were 
                                                 
18 To measure performance we use the Inward FDI Performance Index, which is calculated as the ratio 
of a country’s share in global FDI to its share in global GDP. To measure potential we use the Inward 
FDI Potential Index, which is an unweighted average of 12 structural variables for each economy. See 
UNCTAD (2004) for the list of the variables used. 
  22not very successful in attracting FDI during this period, Egypt, Lebanon and Libya 
were even performing below their economies’ potential. 
The foreign investors into the region mainly originate from Europe, the United 
States and, to a lesser degree, Arab countries. European investors are predominant in 
Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia while substantial investment from the 
United States is attracted by Algeria and Israel (Petri, 1997). The European 
Association Agreements that have been signed by the Mediterranean countries in the 
region
19 were expected to act as a catalyst in boosting European investment into the 
region further. However their effects across the region as a whole have so far been 
limited, possibly due to the increased competition the region faces in attracting 
European FDI from Central and Eastern European countries that have been a major 
target in recent years for European investors (Alessandrini and Resmini, 2000). 
In terms of the sectors that receive incoming FDI, several patterns are evident. 
Inflows attracted by Algeria, Egypt and Syria mainly relate to energy and mining. 
Tourism is important in Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and Egypt. Egypt, Tunisia and 
Morocco also attract FDI directed to basic manufacturing and infrastructures. Finally 
Israel receives substantial FDI relating to electronics and other high technology 
sectors. Petri (1997) argues that the composition of FDI in the region tends to limit the 
benefits of the investment flows in terms of technology transfer and export market 
development. More specifically, the partner composition seems to lack investors with 
factor proportions not too dissimilar to those of the region, while the sectoral 
composition lacks production-oriented investments that could increase the region’s 
integration into international production networks. 
Factors affecting FDI 
The poor performance of the Mediterranean countries in attracting FDI raises 
the following questions: what factors are responsible for this and what can 
policymakers in these countries do to improve the flow of FDI to their countries? To 
address these questions we need to examine the determinants of FDI. 
The importance of the factors affecting inward FDI depends on the strategic 
objectives of the investors. It is thus useful to distinguish the following types of FDI: 
                                                 
19 All the Mediterranean countries have entered into European Association Agreements, with the 
exception of Libya. 
  23horizontal FDI, where the investor primarily seeks to penetrate the local market – 
historically this was the dominant type of FDI internationally – and vertical FDI, 
where the investor seeks to minimise production costs. More recently the following 
FDI strategies have also been identified: export platform FDI where the investor 
establishes a local production base to supply the neighbouring markets (Ekholm et al 
2003) and production fragmentation FDI where the production of the finished good 
occurs in many locations internationally, each one responsible for one stage of the 
process (see eg Baltagi et al 2004). Alessandrini and Resmini (2000) argue that while 
FDI flows to the Mediterranean countries in the previous two decades were mainly 
aiming to overcome custom protectionism, i.e. they were of the Horizontal type, the 
strategies of investors are gradually changing.  
The issue of identifying the factors affecting the size of FDI flows into an 
economy has been addressed quite extensively in the empirical literature.
20 Here we 
focus on the factors that have been recognised as particularly relevant for the 
Mediterranean countries.
21
In most of the empirical research into the determinants of FDI internationally, a 
dominant role is assigned to “gravity” factors, i.e. the size of the market of the host 
economy – usually measured in terms of output, output per capita or population – and 
proximity to the source country.
22 However, in the research that is specific to the 
Mediterranean region, gravity factors do not turn out to be significant, suggesting that 
other factors are the main determinants of FDI flows in this area. 
A factor that has repeatedly been identified in the literature as important is the 
degree of the host country’s openness to trade (Bouklia-Hassane and Zatla, 2000; 
Sekkat and Veganzones-Varoudakis, 2004). These studies also share the conclusion 
that the stock of physical infrastructure that is available in the economy is a principal 
determinant of FDI flows. Furthermore, lack of reform in terms of foreign exchange 
liberalisation in some countries in the region – despite some progress in the 1990s – is 
identified as a factor explaining to a significant degree the poor performance of these 
countries in attracting FDI (Sekkat and Veganzones-Varoudakis, 2004). 
                                                 
20 For a thorough review of the relatively recent contributions to this literature, see Blonigen (2005). 
21 This is appropriate given that empirical research on the determinants of FDI in the Mediterranean 
region suggests that they are significantly different from the determinants in other developing country 
regions (see, for example, Sekkat and Veganzones-Varoudakis, 2003; Alessandrini and Resmini, 2000). 
22 Demekas et al (2005) argue that “the gravity model consistently explains about 60 percent of 
aggregate FDI flows, regardless of the region” and provide extensive references supporting this claim. 
  24A useful insight stemming from the relevant empirical literature is that FDI 
flows in the Mediterranean countries appear to be, to a large extent, resource specific 
(Alessandrini and Resmini, 2000; Petri, 1997). As a result, the natural resource 
endowment of these countries is a significant determinant of the amount of FDI they 
attract. The importance of this effect perhaps also explains the relative insignificance 
of gravity factors in this region. These two contributions also identify the 
intensification of regional integration as an important opportunity to increase the FDI 
attractiveness of the region. There are also indications that the current degree of 
development of the manufacturing sector in the area negatively affects FDI flows, 
which may suggest that there is a threshold effect in the way this factor affects FDI 
and the countries of the region are below the required level of development 
(Alessandrini and Resmini, 2000). 
Finally, the evidence on the effect of macroeconomic reform and stabilisation 
efforts on FDI is, for the time being, inconclusive (Bouklia-Hassane and Zatla, 2000). 
The same study identifies the existence of a negative regional bias, without, however, 
characterising its nature. This bias is perhaps linked with the additional factors cited 
by Petri (1997), without reference to econometric results, namely the existence of 
political tensions and risks, the bureaucratic regulation of investment and the not 
particularly hospitable business climate. 
More specifically, regarding the business climate in Mediterranean countries, 
although progress is gradually being made, there is still a gap compared to south 
European countries and new EU member states.
23 This is illustrated in Figure 11 using 
the World Economic Forum’s Growth Competitiveness Index for 2005,
24 which is a 
measure summarising the quality of the main aspects of a county’s business climate 
(contracts and law, corruption, ICT infrastructure, access to credit, innovation and 
efficiency of public spending). The signing of Association Agreements with the EU is 
expected to assist in the direction of improving the business climate in these countries 
and indeed the countries that signed such agreements early on appear to have attracted 
relatively more FDI as a percentage of GDP than their peers (Bäcker, 2005). 
 
                                                 
23 For a review of the business climate in Mediterranean countries, see European Commission (2005). 
24 Growth Competitiveness Index values are not provided for Lebanon, Libya and Syria. The inclusion 
of index values for these countries is likely to reduce the region average. 
  25Enhancing FDI performance and effectiveness: policy implications 
From the preceding discussion it might appear that, to some extent, factors that 
are exogenous to policymakers determine the amount of FDI flows a country attracts. 
Nevertheless, there is still scope for policy initiatives to enhance FDI performance 
and, most importantly, to maximise the benefits from the FDI received. The following 
guidance can be drawn from the relevant literature for the design of such policies. 
The trade strategy that a candidate host country adopts, i.e. import substitution 
or export promotion, crucially affects both the volume of FDI attracted and its 
effectiveness in bringing about the desired results for the host economy 
(Balasubramanyam et al, 1996). This suggests that a country’s FDI strategy needs to 
be formulated together and in line with its trade strategy. 
The existence of FDI flows into an economy alone does not automatically imply 
that it will benefit from the positive externalities that FDI can bring about. The 
productivity gap between the host and target economies needs to be sufficiently small 
for the host economy to be able to absorb the technology and skills transferred 
(Borensztein et al, 1998). Moreover, policies providing incentives for local firms to 
invest in technology and training are required for the spillover effects to be realised 
(Blomström and Kokko, 2003). 
Competition in investment incentives among candidate target countries 
(especially among the Mediterranean countries) can lead to the transfer of most of the 
potential benefits brought about by FDI from the host economies to the foreign 
investors. This highlights the need for regional coordination in designing incentives, 
particularly given the failure of international attempts for multilateral policy 
coordination, such as the OECD’s MAI initiative (Blomström and Kokko, 2003). 
Moreover, as hinted at above, a push towards greater regional integration will be 
beneficial to the FDI attractiveness of the countries in the area. If, in particular, this 
integration takes the form of a Regional Trade Agreement (RTA), Jaumotte (2004) 
shows that the group
25 would benefit from substantially increased FDI flows, even 
though the gain will be unevenly divided among the RTA members. The resulting 
policy conclusion is that if an RTA is to be created, all members should make efforts 
                                                 
25 In the simulation undertaken in Jaumotte (2004), an RTA among Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia is 
considered. 
  26to bring their business environment up to the level of the best country in the group, to 
ensure that they share in the benefits. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
This paper has examined some of the issues surrounding capital account 
liberalisation in Mediterranean countries. A short review of the benefits of 
liberalisation suggests that those countries that have not yet liberalised have a lot to 
gain from a policy of liberalising, mainly in terms or reducing risk and uncertainty 
and helping to de-link domestic investment decisions from the availability of domestic 
finance. 
Such a conclusion, however, does not mean that a policy of liberalisation will be 
problem-free. The experience of southern European countries which are now euro 
area members as well as the new EU member states with non-FDI private net capital 
flows suggests that net flows (both net inflows and outflows) increase significantly 
following liberalisation. This can have consequences for macroeconomic 
management. Experience in the Mediterranean countries with such capital flows over 
the 1990s and into the current decade highlights the importance of sound 
macroeconomic policies. However, whilst until now contagion has not featured 
greatly in their experience, experience with liberalisation in other regions suggests 
that is unlikely to continue. Countries should therefore be prepared for dealing with 
the challenges that liberalisation will throw up. 
Finally, we focused on FDI inflows which in general operate within a liberalised 
environment already. Despite liberalisation, however, there is evidence that some 
Mediterranean countries are not performing to potential – that is, they should be 
attracting more FDI. This indicates that there is scope for national and regional 
policies that could help boost FDI flows in these countries. Moreover policies can 
increase the effectiveness of the FDI attracted in terms of the benefits for the host 
economies.
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Country  History of exchange rate regime 
 
Algeria  From 1991-1995 the Algerian Dinar was fixed to a basket of currencies (the weights being determined by trade and capital 
movements). On 23 December 1995 it moved to a managed floating system, although in practice it still maintains tight 
control over the dinar/dollar exchange rate. 
Egypt  De facto operating an exchange rate peg to the dollar from 1991 to mid-2000; significant depreciation was allowed from 
mid-2000 onwards. At end-January 2001, a band was introduced (±1% on either side of the central rate of LE2.85/$). 
Throughout 2001 and into 2002, the central rate was devalued on a number of occasions and the band widened to ±3%. As 
of end January 2003, the exchange rate was officially allowed to float. In December 2004, Egypt moved to a unified 
flexible exchange rate system and established a formal interbank foreign exchange market. 
Israel  The New Shekal was pegged to a basket of currencies (DM, FrF, £, ¥, $) with bands around the central rate of ±5%. From 
end 1991, the central rate and bands were adjusted according to inflation differentials. In June 1995, the bands were 
widened to ±7% and the weights adjusted (on basis of 1994 direction of trade statistics). In June 1997, the bands were 
widened to ±15% and the rate of adjustment of the upper and lower bands were altered such that the bands eventually 
became wider and wider. By 2003, the band width had reach 55% (that is, ±27.5%). In 2004, the regime was reclassified as 
an independent float (on a de facto basis) and in June 2005 the exchange rate band was abandoned de jure. 
Jordan  Up until 1995, the Dinar was pegged to the currencies of the SDR; from end-1995 it has been effectively pegged to the 
dollar. 
Lebanon  Up until 1998 it was classified de jure as floating. However, de facto, from the early 1993 it was operating a crawling 
depreciation peg to the $ before moving to a fixed peg in 1998; the exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar depreciated by only 
13.5% between 1993 and 1998. 
Libya  De Jure the Dinar is pegged to the SDR and the exchange rate moves within bands that get larger and larger with the Dinar 
being allowed to depreciate to the limit of the band. Only in 2002 and 2003 were official devaluations carried out. De facto 
the Dinar should be classified as a peg with discrete devaluations. 
Morocco  Initially the Dirham was pegged to the French Franc. In June 1996, a central rate was established relative to a basket of 
currencies and the exchange rate was kept within a band around the central rate. From 1999, with the creation of the euro, 









 Table 1: History of exchange rate regimes in 9 Mediterranean countries (continued) 
 
Country  History of exchange rate regime 
 
Syria  A multiple exchange rate system operates (recently the number of rates was reduced to two, the official rate and the 
neighbouring markets rate. The Pound is pegged to the dollar. 
Tunisia  Until February 1994, the Dinar was pegged to a basket of currencies. Thereafter it became a managed float; it was 
reclassified in 1999 as a crawling peg; reclassified in end 2000 as managed floating with no preannounced path. From 1 
January 2002, it has been following a real effective exchange rate rule. 
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, various years, IMF Website, ECB Country Review Sheets 






Table 2: Controls on capital movements 
 
Country      Capital controls
 
Algeria  1990: fairly extensive controls. Export proceeds needed to be surrendered; residents had to repatriate and surrender any 
assets acquired abroad; capital transfers abroad required authorisation; inward FDI was permitted and repatriation 
guaranteed. In 2000 there was some opening of portfolio investment to foreigners (allowing investments in the Algerian 
Stock Market, bond markets, etc. and the repatriation of investment sale proceeds). 
Egypt  1990: fairly extensive controls. Export receipts repatriation and surrender requirements were in place; outward capital 
transactions were restricted; some inward FDI and portfolio investment was permitted; multiple exchange rate system. By 
end-1991 a unitary exchange rate system had been adopted. From 1994, repatriation of export receipts was abolished; it 
was reintroduced briefly in March 2003 and abolished again in December 2004.  
Israel  1990: fairly extensive controls on export proceeds, capital movements. These were liberalised slowly starting in 1994 
when outward FDI was partially liberalised, for example. In 1998 significant liberalisation occurred with limits on 
controlled capital movements being raised. From 1 January 2003, all controls were removed, with only some reporting 
requirements remaining. 
Jordan  1990: fairly extensive controls. Export receipts were controlled; inward capital movements were not restricted (including 
FDI), although permission was required for outward flows; repatriation of inward FDI capital was subject to approval. In 
1994-95 the requirements re export receipts were liberalised. In 1997, most controls on capital transactions were abolished 
(July), although a few (minor) restrictions were introduced in 2000. 
Lebanon  1990: Only some capital transactions (including lending to nonresidents, taking deposits from nonresidents and bank 
lending to residents to purchase foreign exchange) involved controls; no controls on FDI. In 1998, more controls were 
added, with less important restrictions being introduced in subsequent years, although the system of controls does not 
appear to be that extensive.  
Libya  1990: An extensive system of capital controls was in place, including export receipt surrender rules and a requirement to 
obtain permission for any investment of capital abroad; inward FDI, on a joint-venture basis, was allowed provided that it 
is in the interests of the country’s development. In 1999 the parallel exchange market was legalised by creating a dual 







 Table 2: Controls on capital movements (continued) 
 
Country      Capital controls
 
Morocco  1990: significant controls applied including export receipt surrender rules and restrictions on transfers of capital abroad; 
inward FDI was allowed although approval may have been necessary. Full liberalisation of inward FDI (including the 
repatriation of sale proceeds) was made in 1992. Liberalisation has subsequently been measured.  
Syria  1990: extensive controls on export receipts surrender, outward FDI flows and capital flows in general; FDI inflows were 
actually encouraged by favourable conditions in some areas; a system of multiple exchange rates operated. 2003-4 saw 
some simplification of the system (elimination of the repatriation and surrender requirements for export proceeds) but 
controls are still extensive. 
Tunisia  1990: extensive controls on export receipt surrender and capital account transactions; inward FDI was allowed and 
incentives were provided in some cases. Inward portfolio investment was partially liberalised in 1995. Limited 
liberalisation, mainly relating to export proceeds surrender rules and outward FDI, was recorded in later years. 




 Table 3: Capital flows, exchange rate regimes and changes in foreign exchange reserves 
 
Country Correlation  between  private  non-FDI capital flows and changes 
in foreign exchange reserves 
Correlation between current account and 
changes in foreign exchange reserves 
  Whole period  Periods of non-pegged 
exchange rates 
Periods of pegged 
exchange rates 
Whole period 
Egypt          -0.57 - -0.59 0.79
Israel          0.01 0.21 -0.45 -0.33
Jordan          -0.62 - -0.62 0.44
Libya          -0.93 - -0.93 0.90
Morocco         -0.72 - -0.72 0.68
Tunisia          -0.18 0.01 -0.32 0.25
       
All Countries  -0.62  0.25  -0.64  0.56 
Note: There is not sufficient data for Algeria, Lebanon.  
 






Table 4: Growth rates
1: Mediterranean – southern European Euro Area 
countries compared 
 
Country  Average growth rate, 
1980-2003 
Standard deviation of growth 
rates 
Algeria 3.2  3.2 
Egypt 5.2  3.0 
Israel 4.7  3.0 
Jordan 2.7  4.8 
Lebanon 4.4  20.2 
Libya 0.2  5.6 
Morocco 4.5  5.3 
Syria 3.8  6.0 
Tunisia 5.3  2.9 
Average 3.8  6.0 
France 4.4  1.8 
Greece 4.3  2.0 
Ireland 7.5  3.1 
Italy 4.7 2.0 
Portugal 5.8  3.1 
Spain 5.5  1.9 
Average 5.4  2.3 
  Note: 1. Growth rates of GDP per capita in PPP USD. 
 




Table 5: Variability of the investment gap
1 in Mediterranean – southern 
European Euro Area countries compared 
 


















Note: 1. The investment gap is defined as the deviation of actual investment from its trend.  
           The trend was derived using a Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
 
     Source: Own calculations based on data from IMF, International Financial Statistics,   
     CD ROM. Table 6: The determinants of net capital flows in selected Mediterranean countries 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Variable 
 
Coefficient Standard  error      Coefficient Standard  error Coefficient Standard  error
Growth    0.361*  0.198  0.260    0.119 **   0.802*  0.424
Lagged growth  0.326*  0.184  0.261  **  0.117  0.606**  0.274 
Lagged inflation  -0.347*  0.193  -0.245  **  0.114  -0.255*  0.152 
Lagged government 
 balance 
0.455              0.297 0.540** 0.215 0.568** 0.264
Financial intermediation  -0.183**  0.086  -0.180  ***  0.052  -0.232***  0.074 
Exchange rate dummy  0.003  0.016         
Domestic interest rate (lag)  0.002  0.003         
US CD rate (lagged)  -0.001  0.004         
Broad money growth  -0.322***  0.111  -0.251  ***  0.078  -0.284***  0.108 
Asia -0.004  0.016         
Russia        0.007  0.017    
Capital control index  0.016**  0.007  0.016  ***  0.005  0.014*  0.008 
Constant 0.095  0.107  0.089  0.053  0.102  0.071 
                 
Fixed effects  F(4, 35) = 6.74 
[probability > F = 0.000] 
F(5,51) = 10.47 
[probability > F = 0.000] 
F(5,46) = 7.96 
[probability > F =0.000] 
Number of observations  52  64  59 
Overall significance of the 
model (F-test) 
F(12,35) = 5.71 
[probability > F = 0.000] 
F(7,51) = 11.56 
[probability >F  = 0.000] 
F(13,46) = 7.89 
[probability > F = 0.000] 
R-squared: within  0.6620  0.6133  0.5003 
R-squared: overall  0.2185  0.1597  0.1677 
Hausman Test    Chi
2(7) = 55.36 
Probability > chi
2 = 0.000 
 
Notes: * indicates significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level. The Hausman test is for fixed versus 
random effects model (Ho: random effects model appropriate). Model 3 using instrumental variables where lagged 





Table 7: Distinguishing net inflows from net outflows 
 
 Model  4 
Variable 
 
Dummy Coefficient  Standard  error 
Growth in  0.247  0.163 
 out  0.046  0.777 
Lagged growth  in  0.094  0.598 
 out  0.176  0.211 
Lagged inflation  in  -0.026  0.915 




in 0.471 0.151 
 out  0.566**  0.022 
Financial 
intermediation 
in -0.067  0.353 
 out  -0.113*  0.065 
Broad money 
growth 
in -0.258**  0.019 
 out  -0.193*  0.072 
Capital control 
index 
in 0.008 0.171 
 out  0.010*  0.065 
Constant 0.053  0.371 
    
Fixed effects  F(5, 44) = 3.52 
[probability > F = 0.009] 
Number of observations  64 
Overall significance of the 
model (F-test) 
F(14,44) = 9.19 
[probability > F = 0.000] 
R-squared: within  0.7452 
R-squared: overall  0.4752 
Notes: As in table 6. ‘in’ and ‘out’ refer to the effect of the 
explanatory variable where there are net inflows and 
outflows, respectively.  
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Source: Own calculations.  
 Figure 2a: Net capital flows in Mediterranean countries 
 
Net Capital Flows: Egypt
 
 Financial account %GDP  Financial account plus E&O %GDP









Net Capital Flows (excl. FDI): Egypt
 
 Financial account excl.FDI %GDP  Financial account plus E&O excl









Net Capital Flows: Libya
 
 Financial account %GDP  Financial account plus E&O %GDP








Net Capital Flows (excl.FDI): Libya
 
 Financial account excl.FDI %GDP  Financial account plus E&O excl



















 Figure 2b: Net capital flows in Mediterranean countries 
 
 
Net Capital Flows: Jordan
 
 Financial account %GDP  Financial account plus E&O %GDP








Net Capital Flows (excl.FDI): Jordan
 
 Financial account excl.FDI %GDP  Financial account plus E&O excl








Net Capital Flows (excl. gvt flows and FDI): Jordan
 
 Financial account excl.FDI&gvt/  Financial account plus E&O excl



















Figure 2c: Net capital flows in Mediterranean countries 
 
 
Net Capital Flows: Israel
 
 Financial account %GDP  Financial account plus E&O %GDP









Net Capital Flows (excl.FDI): Israel
 
 Financial account excl.FDI %GDP  Financial account plus E&O excl









Net Capital Flows (excl.gvt flows and FDI): Israel
 
 Financial account excl.FDI&gvt/  Financial account plus E&O excl














Source: Own calculations based on data from IMF, Balance of Payments, CD ROM.  
 
 
 Figure 2d: Net capital flows in Mediterranean countries 
 
 
Net Capital Flows: Morocco
 
 Financial account %GDP  Financial account plus E&O %GDP







Net Capital Flows (excl.FDI): Morocco
 
 Financial account excl.FDI %GDP  Financial account plus E&O excl










Net Capital Flows (excl. gvt flows and FDI): Morocco
 
 Financial account excl.FDI&gvt/  Financial account plus E&O excl














Source: Own calculations based on data from IMF, Balance of Payments, CD ROM.  
 Figure 2e: Net capital flows in Mediterranean countries 
 
Net Capital Flows: Tunisia
 
 Financial account %GDP  Financial account plus E&O %GDP







Net Capital Flows (excl.FDI): Tunisia
 
 Financial account excl.FDI %GDP  Financial account plus E&O excl





Net Capital Flows (excl. gvt. flows and FDI): Tunisia
 
 Financial account excl.FDI&gvt/  Financial account plus E&O excl









Source: Own calculations based on data from IMF, Balance of Payments, CD ROM.  
  
Figure 2f: Net capital flows in Mediterranean countries 
 
 
Net Capital Flows: Syria
 
 Financial account %GDP  Financial account plus E&O %GDP







Net Capital Flows (excl. FDI): Syria
 
 Financial account excl.FDI %GDP  Financial account plus E&O excl









6 Source: Own calculations based on data from IMF, Balance of Payments, CD ROM. 
  
 
Figure 3: Israel and Jordan – net capital flows – quarterly data 
 
 
Net Capital Flows (excl.FDI): Israel
 
 excl. errors & omissions  incl. errors & omissions










Net Capital Flows (excl.FDI): Jordan
 
 excl. errors & omissions  incl. errors & omissions
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Figure 5: Technology indicators 
 
 
























FDI per capita (USD)
















Source: Own calculations based on data from UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004 and IMF, 
International Financial Statistics CD ROM. 
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FDI Inflows to Southern Med Countries in USD million (Left Axis)
FDI Inflows to Southern Med Countries over World FDI Inflows (Right Axis)
FDI Inflows to Southern Med Countries over Developping Countries FDI Inflows (Right Axis)






































































































































































































Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004; own calculations

































Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004; own calculations
 
 






















































countries Source: WEF, Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006




53 Appendix 1: The capital controls intensity index 
The difficulties related to the appropriate measurement of the extent and intensity of 
capital controls, particularly in the context of a cross-country study, have been well 
documented in the literature (see for example Eichengreen, 2001; Eichengreen et al 1998). 
Broadly classified the approaches proposed fall under two categories. One class of capital 
controls measures is based on the information appearing in the Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) published annually by the 
IMF. These measures vary in scope and sophistication and range from a simple binary 
variable indicating the existence of capital controls as reported in the AREAER, to 
disaggregated measures based on the AREAER 13-subcategory classification of capital 
controls in its post 1997 editions (and extending this classification backwards; see 
Miniane, 2004) and measures based on principle components analysis of the AREAER 
binary variables (Chinn and Ito, 2002). However such indices often fail to capture the 
intensity of the capital controls in place as, due to their inherently binary nature, they 
attribute the same importance to all controls. Moreover, they are, in effect, de jure 
measures as the AREAER does not normally provide information on the enforceability of 
capital controls. 
The other class of measures proposed in the literature is designed to address this 
issue by using proxies of a country’s capital account openness as de facto indices. Such 
proxies include onshore-offshore interest rate differentials (see Dooley, 1996, for a survey 
of such indices), the ratio of total market capitalization of equities that are available for 
purchase by foreign investors over total market capitalization (Edison and Warnock, 2003) 
and the ratio of a country’s portfolio and direct investment assets and liabilities over GDP 
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001). Unfortunately the data required to construct such de 
facto indices is often not available. 
In view of the data availability limitations for the countries in our sample, which do 
not permit the construction of a proxy-based de facto measure, and in order to capture the 
intensity and not merely the extent of capital controls, we constructed a capital controls 
intensity index, using the information reported in the AREAER. The difference between 
this measure and existing indices based on the AREAER is that we assess the severity of 
each capital control reported rather than treating it in a binary fashion (existence/non-
existence). In this sense, the index constructed is most closely related to that in Quinn 
(1997). 
54 55 
                                                
The index constructed captures mainly the information contained in the “Capital” 
section (“Capital Transactions” section for the editions from 1997 onwards) of the 
AREAER text for each country. Recognising, however, the role that a multiple exchange 
rate system or a requirement to repatriate and/or surrender export proceeds can play in 
restricting capital flows, we also considered these aspects when constructing the index. To 
the extent possible, from the information provided by the AREAER (particularly before 
the 1997 edition), we considered restrictions on both outgoing and incoming capital flows. 
A detailed typology of capital controls in the countries of our sample and 
corresponding scores cannot be compiled due to the variability in the types of controls 
employed across countries and the fact that the way the restrictions are reported in the 
AREAER changed considerably from the 1997 edition onwards. In this respect it should 
be noted that our methodology involves the exercise of judgment.
26 However the degree of 
subjectivity involved is moderated by the use of a scoring hierarchy for the intensity of the 
restriction in place with respect to each type of transaction, as follows (from stricter to less 
strict): 
•  Transaction not allowed 
•  Transaction allowed but approval required 
•  Transaction allowed under conditions 
•  Transaction allowed but reporting required 
•  No restrictions. 
In any case, the residual subjectivity should not severely affect our results as long as 
consistency across time and countries is maintained. In order to ensure this, we follow an 
incremental approach when compiling the index and use the following sequence. We start 
with one country (Israel) and assign scores for all the years in our sample, in an 
incremental fashion, starting from 2003 and going back. A zero score is deemed to denote 
that no restrictions were in place, while the score increases with the intensity and extent of 
the controls. For the first year in the sample (1990), we compare the capital controls status 
of each country in our cross-section with that of Israel and assign a score accordingly. 
Based on the 1990 result for each country we assign a score value for each year in the 
sample, in an incremental way. As a final step, we check the cross-country consistency of 
the scores for the final year in the sample (2003). 
 
 
26 This diverges from the approach in Quinn (1997), where a simple coding rule was devised and followed 
for the construction of the index. Appendix 2: Data sources and information 
Data on capital flows and other balance of payments items is from IMF Balance of Payments, CD ROM. Data on macroeconomic aggregates 
is from IMF International Financial Statistics, CD ROM; GDP per capita data in PPP is from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 
2005. Data on FDI is from the UNCTAD World Investment Report 2004. Data on technology indicators is from World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. Data on the business climate is from the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006. 
 
 
Table A1: Basic macroeconomic aggregates – real growth (% per annum) 
 
                              1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Algeria                              - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Egypt                              1.1 4.5 2.9 4.0 4.6 5.0 5.5 7.5 6.1 5.4 3.5 3.2 3.1 4.1
Israel                              5.6 6.6 3.2 6.8 7.1 5.2 3.5 3.7 2.5 8.0 -0.9 -0.7 1.3 4.3
Jordan                              1.6 14.4 4.5 5.0 6.2 2.1 3.3 3.0 3.1 4.1 4.9 4.8 3.3 -
Lebanon  -                            - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Libya                             - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Morocco                             8.9 -3.2 -1.7 10.6 -6.6 11.8 -2.2 7.7 -0.1 1.0 6.3 3.2 5.2 3.4
Syria  7.9                            13.5 5.2 7.7 5.8 7.3 2.5 7.6 -2.0 0.6 3.4 3.2 - -
Tunisia                              3.9 7.8 2.2 3.2 2.4 7.1 5.4 4.8 6.1 4.7 4.9 1.7 5.6 5.8
5
6
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, CD ROM. 
  
Table A2: Basic macroeconomic aggregates – inflation (% per annum) 
 
                              1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Algeria                              25.9 31.7 20.5 29.1 29.8 18.7 5.7 5.0 2.6 0.3 4.2 1.4 2.6 3.6
Egypt                              19.8 13.6 12.1 8.1 15.7 7.2 4.6 3.9 3.1 2.7 2.3 2.7 4.5 11.3
Israel                              19.0 11.9 10.9 12.3 10.0 11.3 9.0 5.4 5.2 1.1 1.1 5.6 0.7 -0.4
Jordan                              8.2 4.0 3.3 3.5 2.4 6.5 3.0 3.1 0.6 0.7 1.8 1.8 2.3 -
Lebanon  -                            - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Libya                             - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Morocco                             8.0 5.7 5.2 5.1 6.1 3.0 1.0 2.8 0.7 1.9 0.6 2.8 1.2 -
Syria  9.0                            11.0 13.2 15.3 8.0 8.2 1.9 -0.8 -3.7 -3.8 3.0 1.0 - -
Tunisia                              8.2 5.8 4.0 4.7 6.2 3.7 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.9 2.0 2.7 2.7 3.6




Table A3: Basic macroeconomic aggregates – government budget balance as a % of GDP 
 
                                1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Algeria                                - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Egypt                                -5.7 -0.9 -3.5 1.7 0.3 0.9 -1.9 -2.0 -0.9 -0.1 -1.2 -2.2 -2.5 -2.4 -2.5
Israel                                -5.3 -6.7 -4.2 -2.5 -3.0 -4.4 -4.2 0.3 -1.4 -2.0 0.9 -3.6 - - -
Jordan                                -3.4 0.4 5.0 3.6 1.0 1.0 -1.3 -3.2 -5.8 -2.4 -2.0 -2.5 - - -
Lebanon                                - - - -7.7 -17.5 -18.6 -20.8 -26.8 -16.1 -16.2 - - - - -
Libya                               - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Morocco                                -2.2 -2.1 -1.4 -2.6 -3.2 -4.4 -3.0 -1.5 -3.8 0.9 -5.9 -2.6 -4.3 -3.7 -
Syria  0.3                              1.3 1.7 0.0 -3.7 -1.8 -0.2 -0.2 -0.7 0.7 - - - - -
Tunisia                                -5.4 -5.9 -3.1 -3.2 -1.4 -3.2 -3.1 -4.1 -0.9 -2.6 - - - - -
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, CD ROM. 
 
  
Table A4: Basic macroeconomic aggregates – current account balance as a % of GDP 
 
                                1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Algeria                              2.3 5.1 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Egypt                                0.4 5.6 6.8 4.9 0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.9 -3.0 -1.8 -1.1 -0.5 0.7 5.5 -
Israel                                0.3 -2.1 -1.3 -3.7 -4.5 -5.2 -5.2 -3.2 -1.1 -1.7 -1.3 -1.7 -1.5 0.5 0.4
Jordan                                -5.4 -9.1 -15.7 -11.2 -6.4 -3.8 -3.2 0.4 0.2 5.0 0.7 0.0 3.8 9.7 -
Lebanon  -                              - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Libya  7.2                              -0.7 4.4 -4.8 0.1 6.6 4.4 5.1 -1.2 7.0 23.8 12.9 0.6 - -
Morocco                                -0.8 -1.5 -1.5 -1.9 -2.4 -3.9 -0.2 -0.5 -0.4 -0.5 -1.5 4.7 4.1 3.5 -
Syria  7.4                              2.5 0.2 -0.6 -1.8 0.5 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.3 1.3 1.4 1.6 - -
Tunisia                                -3.8 -3.6 -7.1 -9.0 -3.4 -4.3 -2.4 -3.2 -3.4 -2.1 -4.2 -4.2 -3.5 -2.9 -
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, CD ROM.  
 
 
Table A5: Basic macroeconomic aggregates – M2/GDP 
            1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995                    1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Algeria                                61.9 48.1 49.2 54.6 49.3 39.9 35.6 39.1 45.6 45.3 40.5 48.9 63.7 64.2 -
Egypt                                85.9 87.5 84.5 84.7 84.6 79.8 78.6 77.7 77.0 76.0 76.7 82.4 87.8 96.7 97.4
Israel                                69.8 64.1 67.2 70.9 72.7 75.8 81.0 82.4 89.2 94.5 93.2 100.5 104.0 102.2 100.9
Jordan                              127.0 137.2 116.2 112.9 103.9 101.6 96.6 99.4 96.8 108.8 112.7 115.1 118.3 131.0 - 
Lebanon                                195.6 142.7 125.8 119.5 131.1 128.7 143.5 157.2 163.8 180.6 198.4 209.0 217.2 233.7 -
Libya  68.1                            61.4 67.4 73.0 77.9 79.6 70.5 58.5 67.4 65.2 54.2 57.7 41.3 -  -
Morocco                                53.9 55.3 60.0 63.3 62.3 66.0 62.2 72.6 71.2 78.1 82.7 87.2 89.4 92.3 -
Syria  54.7                              53.3 53.4 62.5 57.3 55.5 50.5 50.7 52.8 57.8 62.3 73.0 82.5 - -
Tunisia                                51.5 49.0 46.6 46.2 46.3 45.8 46.4 49.3 48.2 52.3 55.3 56.7 56.9 56.3 57.6
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, CD ROM. 
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